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NOTRE DAME
LAWYER
A Quarterly Law Review
I
VOL. XXI SEPTEMBER, 1945 NO. 1
"RACIALISM AND THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS"
T HE juridical institutions of peace which were constructed
at the San Francisco Conference depend for their suc-
cess upon conformity to certain ethical criteria of national
attitude and conduct. One of the most dangerous pitfalls
awaiting the nations in the post-war world is the resurgence
of racialism, which has been destroyed in Germany and will
soon be ended in Japan, but which has proved itself a peren-
nial phenomenon in the ways of men. Fortunately in this
connection, the Russian Empire, a Marxist State based on
the premise of class and dedicated to the economic ideal of
enlarged production, has not exhibited an inclination to
pivot foreign policy upon a dogma of Pan-Slavism. The
British Empire and the United States, predicated upon
democracy and controlled capitalism in the domestic and in-
ternational spheres, do not evidence any likelihood of future
exploitation in the name of the supremacy of the Anglo-
Saxon race. At the present time, therefore, the three great
powers in whose hands is the keeping of the world's peace
seem in no danger of succumbing to the temptation of un-
qualified racialism. There is no guarantee, however, of the
indefinite continuance of such a situation. Moreover, the
threat of injustices resulting from qualified racialism is very
great, with consequent peril to the world's peace.
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Racialism in the sense of elaborated doctrine, assuming
vast metaphysical and even quasi-religious proportions in the
writings of men who purport to rationalize certain ethical
conclusions from race, is best exemplified by the racial credo
in Germany under the Hitlerian regime. Distortion of ethical
perspective is carried to the extent of substituting race for
Divinity, and is coupled with emotional exhortation to fa-
natical action. The technique of express historical affirmation
and recourse to the instrument of reason, however deformed,
betrays the survival of the implements of Western Culture.
It also discloses the necessity of intellectual conversion on
the part of the masses of the nation.
Oriental racialism generated and reared in a habitat
wherein there never existed the necessity for giving reasons
on the part of those in omnipotent authority needs neither
metaphysics nor defensive doctrinal barricades. Japanese
racialism is so characterized. The history of Japanese con-
quest, territorial expansion, and ruthless treatment of so-
called inferior people is evidence, however, of the tremendous
imminent capacities of implied racist theory to incite the
rank and file of the Japanese people, to islamic activity.
Non-doctrinal racialism, or fragmentary racism, super-
imposed upon a limited metaphysics of economic and political
or semi-political utility, generally speaking, does not exalt
race diversity to the niche of the greatest cosmic good. A
diagnosis of such racialism may 'be observed in the course
of the development of such empires as the British, French
and Dutch, and in the formation of the American Union.
Relative ethical values only are attached to race, impliedly,
by a pragmatic behavior according to this type of racialism.
It is true, of course, that such behavior can be and has 'been
the source of great injustice, 'but it is always more just than
the conduct inspired by the ideals of unqualified, totalitarian
racialism.
The expressions race, nationality, state, and racialism are
obviously vague because 'of the variability of content which
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has characterized the usage of these terms. In this paper,
race will mean a group of human beings, larger than the
family, unified only by kinship of blood, and by those effects
which have resulted exclusively from this biological fact.
Nationality will mean the result of the unification of men of
the same or of different races, by such rational, historical,
and ethnological causes as similarity of language, law, or
identity of political, economic and social objective, or re-
ligious faith, or general way of life, so as to form a moral
personality. State will express the product arising from na-
tionality, when it has evolved to a condition wherein the in-
herent political and juridical forces of the community of
human individuals assume a position of dominance and con-
trol. Unqualified or totalitarian racialism will describe the
doctrine which proclaims that only race can be the true and
sufficient principle upon which social organization ought to
be attempted, so that all heterogeneous racial minorities in
a particular society must be expelled or destroyed, and which
attaches superior moral rights to specific races, in their, rela-
tion with other races. Qualified racialism will denote be-
havior which implies race superiority in the sense of result-
ing economic and political exploitation, social restriction, and
imposed paternalism.
The parts which were played 'by race, nationality, state
and racialism in the thrilling panorama of anthropological
activity may be studied from the viewpoints of the pre-Chris-
tian, and Christian periods, and the more recent period in
which an unsuccessful attempt has been made to overthrow
the racial teachings of Christianity. The first stage may
be broken down into the primitive and the civilized. The
second may be sub-divided into the pre-Reformational and
post-Reformational. The third period never reached frui-
tion, despite powerful efforts which sought to initiate it, but
it 'behooves Christian civilization to see to it that the threat
is never made again.
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In the first or savage phase of the pre-Christian era, man
was groping forward to regain, as best he could, some meas-
ure of the perfection which he had lost through his fall in
Paradise. His earliest social structures were based on, the
family, later on the tribe, or a number of families. The
principal cause of tribal cohesion was a close blood bond.
Man, the rational animal, was then chiefly concerned with
the survival of his animal constituent. In the interests of
such survival, each race vindicated itself and its ways. It
had to believe in itself and it did. Race became identified
with the ultimate common good, and became an active cause
of group behavior which at times ran counter to reason. But
there were extenuating circumstances in this primitive inter-
lude to excuse these assertions of racialism, for man had not
yet been redeemed, nor had he progressed far in his deter-
mination to ascend the steep path of rational and intellectual
achievement. There was hardly nationality in this first
phase of the pre-Christian period, and no state.
In the second part of the pre-Christian period, the concept
of nationality arose. Men in society perceived that there
were national, as well as biological ties, which held them to-
gether. The race basis of society was superseded by the sub-
structure of nationality. In this transition, the unity of
nationality was the consequence of rising above the physical
factor of race, because in many cases, two or more races be-
came so associated as to form a nation. In the genesis of
nation from family, tribe and race, an examination of the
population makeup of nations, upon which the metaphysical
units of nationality were superimposed, discloses that each
succeeding product retained fractionally elements of each
preceding product.
The creations of mind which accompanied man's biological
expansion included ethnic institutions which gradually re-
placed those previously based on race. Among the Ro-
mans, after the rise of their City-State, there grew up a new
system of justice whereby Jus Gentium, a system of positive
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law, representing elements common to the legal orders of non-
Roman peoples, and expressing the justice of the idealized
Jus Naturale, was administered in its own tribunals. It
sought to render justice to members of foreign races living
in Rome. Roman society, for example, would not allow such
races to participate in the protection of the Jus Civile, the
legal system for the benefit of free Romans. When in the
second century before Christ, however, the new court of the
Praetor Peregrinus was formed to apply the Jus Gentium,
there was a classic implicit rejection of racialism, because
free foreigners were by positive law accorded moral rights
which Roman tribunals protected. The major trend, there-
fore, in the civilized phase of the pre-Christian era was away
from racialism. This is not to say, however, that race pride
and consciousness ceased to exist, at that time.
Secondly, from its very inception, Christianity preached
the brotherhood of man, under the Fatherhood of God. Its
divine Founder exhorted His Apostles to go forth and preach
the gospel to "omnes gentes," all the peoples, races, and na-
tions of the earth, without any discrimination whatsoever.
From the fourth century A.D., when the Church became
recognized by the civil authority as a lawful social influence
in the Roman Empire to the thirteenth, when the Church
reached its maximum prestige, Catholic moralists, like St.
Augustine and Isidore of Seville, insisted upon a code of
morality and action among nations which absolutely pre-
cluded racialism. They visualized an international order,
subject to an objectively existing natural law and responsive
to honor anid fidelity among the Nations.
Canon law, or the legal system for the government of the
Church, embodied the principle of universality as applied
judicially, irrespective of race or nation, as a prototype of
international law. Another body of justice, analogous to in-
ternational law, also grew in the great General Councils of
the East and West which passed judgment on the acts of
the rulers in relation to other sovereigns, irrespective of race
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or nationality. These great representative Assemblies stressed
the unity of Christendom, gave proper place to the claims of
diverse racial elements, and demonstrated the possibility of
a world society governed by one law.
After the destruction of the Roman Empire, the Papacy
was the only power in Europe offsetting the chaotic condi-
tions of feudalism, which offered countless opportunities to
return to the jungle of racialism. It did this by a direct re-
ligious appeal to the individual, and by uniting in one spir-
itual brotherhood the conflicting and warring racial elements
which gained the ascendency when Rome fell. During this
chapter of history, the Papacy restricted warfare by legal
methods, abolished pagan and irrational modes of trial, such
as battle and ordeal, created specific devices for the efficient
and adequate functioning of international law, and con-
demned racialism.
In the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century,
the Church enjoyed great prestige and accordingly made out-
standing contributions to the cause of international peace
through the reign of law and the denial of racialism. The
doctrine that the actions of nations are ethical phenomena
evolved from the tenets of Christianity and the writings of
scholastic jurists. The essentially Catholic contributions of
such writers as Vitoria and Suarez paved the way for Grotius,
whose monumental work, on the law of war and peace, would
not have been possible without the studies and researches of
scholastic canonists and fathers of the Church. This was the
period of Gratian and St. Thomas Aquinas. Gratian, in his
Decretum,' restated from Isidore of Seville the divisions of
law into divine and natural, positive, public and private, and
military, and described the contents thereof. Aquinas in his
Summa 2 elaborated with precision the conditions of a just
1 Gratian, Decretum, pages 1 and 2 (Editio Lipsiensis Secunda post Aemilii
Ludovici R ichteri, Aemilius Friedberg) 1879; thus C. IX and C. X, D.L. Quid
sit jus gentium, (Isidor, Eod. C. 6) and Quid sit jus militare (Isidor, Eod. C. 7)
2 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (1918 - Dominican Transl.), II, qu. 40,
art. 1 - 4.
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war using the authority of Augustine,' and thereby con-
tributed greatly to the international law of war. The norm
of moral good and bad in all these writings was the natural
law, the Divine will, which accorded equality of religious
and ethical value to every nation. The nations of the world
were regarded as moral and juridical persons, as. subject to
the natural law as individual human persons. Just as God
has willed what is good and evil in the area of behavior for
each human being, so likewise has He willed an ethical, ex-
ternal norm to which men in groups or civilly organized
societies ought to conform. It was the teaching of the
Church that races and nations are bound by the "ought" of
the moral law because they are composed of individual
human beings whose intrinsic ethical value continued despite
the creation of public and social interests through the unify-
ing influences which generated race and nationality.
With the appearance of the Reformation, in the sixteenth
century, an infallible nationalism began to make headway in
many areas of Europe. Certain nations claimed and put into
effect their own standards of morality, as between Church
and State, between ruler and ruled, and between nation and
nation. Since the doctrine of an unchanging body of ethical
norms to which all men, whether considered individually or
collectively in distinct racial or national groups was rejected
by many, it became expedient to improvise, from time to
time, international agreements, which left little more of the
natural law than the rule, "pacta servanda sunt," in many
instances more honored in the breach than in the observance.
The modern state was formed as soon as the political
forces in the various national communities, such as Anglia,
Gallia and Germania, which had been considered "unities
for the Papal Chancery long before their political unity had
been formed," asserted their sovereignty to a degree which
broke down the moral unity of Christendom.4 Nationalism,
8 Augustine, Ep. ad Marcel. 138; Contra Faust. 22; Ep. ad Bonif. 189.
4 Kisch, Nationalism and Race in Medieval Law,, 1 Seminar 48, at page 53.
See Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, 1928.
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which hitherto had been principally ethnological, now became
chiefly political. The moral power of the Church which
had previously resisted with success the unreasonable claims
of a growing consciousness of nationality, becoming intense
in the fourteenth century, became impaired. As soon as the
tool of supreme political, juridical, and religious power came
into the hands of these nationalistic forces, the construction
of the infallibly omnipotent national state became inevitable,
as well as the doom of the solidarity of the family of nations.
Despite the genesis of such a state, racialism did not soon
become the test of the goodness or badness of national ac-
tion in international relations. But as soon as each national
state began to set up its own ideals in international behavior
and enjoyed a selection of objectives, even though conscience
and reason, subjectively considered, were to be the final
determinants, the door was opened to the possible ultimate
identification of race with the greatest good of the politically
organized community. Once the authority of an objectively
existing natural law was removed, the dominant will of the
majority had difficulty in perceiving any justification out-
side of itself from which could come an absolute conviction
that its judgments and decisions were wiser than those of a
minority or minorities. Nations like Japan and Germany
were mainly homogeneous racially, but did not enjoy a long
imperial tradition as a result of a lengthy survival of a strong
political sovereign, resulting in the belief that whatever the
sovereign did, in the domain of international affairs, was
ethically unchallengeable. In such nations there was a
tendency, therefore, to have recourse to the absolute author-
ity of race. The next sequence was to seek to massacre or
expel all racial minorities, if any, within the State, and to
subjugate or exterminate all competing nations, if they were
made up of so-called inferior races. The error of this type
of thinking and acting was one of ethical starting point.
The third stage of international dealing began when Ger-
many and Japan began to substitute the norms of racialism
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for the ideals of a natural law, based on reason. This doc-
trine was elaborated in Germany by such writers as Rosen-
berg,5 Frank 6 and Gunther 7 in the thirties. These authors
had been preceded by such pioneering non-German authors
as Gobineau,8 and Chamberlain,9 in the nineteenth Century,
which sought to show the moral and intellectual inequalities
among the different races of men by the application of the
methods of materialistic, positivistic science. rn line with
this current of thinking was the work of Lombroso in
the field of criminal anthropology.' ° In Japan, racialism
needed no formal exposition as it was already widely ac-
cepted, and the oriental mind was not in-need of the same
degree of rationalization as the western." Race which had
already begun to compete with nationality became victorious.
The significance of this change was profound, because it in-
troduced into the forum of international relations a point
of view which had existed previously only among groups of
5 Rosenberg, Der Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts, 4th ed., Munich, 1932, p.
21, ff.
6 Frank, Nationalsozialistischen Handbuch fur Recht und Gesetzgebung,
(Munich, 1935).
7 Gunther, Rassenkunde des Deutschen Volkes, Munich, 1930.
8 Gobineau, Essai pur l'inegalit6 des races humaines, Paris, 1853, 1856.
9 Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts, Leipzig, 1907.
10 Lombroso, Criminal Man, (briefly summarized by his daughter, Gina
Lombroso Ferrero), 1911; See Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf, 1883; Mazzarelia,
La. Concezione etnologica della legislazione, 6 Rivista Internazionali di filosofia del
diritto, 520-634; Pittard, Race and History (translated by Collum) 1926; Riemann,
Rassee und Recht, 35 Zeitschrift fur Geschichtliche Staafswissenschaft 273.
11 See Young, The Rise of a Pagan State: Japan's Religious Background,
1939; Holtom, Modem Japan and Shinto Nationalism, a Study of Present Day
Trends -in Japanese Religions, 1943. At page 157 Holtom quotes Hideo Horie who
wrote in the Shukyo Nenkan ("Year Book of Religion," 1939) on the subject,
"The Shinto Shrine Problem Overseas" to the effect that true members of the
Japanese race regard themselves .as the offspring of the gods. In spite of the
infusion of -the blood of other peoples in times past, the genuine Yamato stock
predominates; for the most part, the breed is pure. Holtom at page 158, still
quoting Horie writes that the Shrine of Shinto strengthens the corporate fusion
of the race and at page 168, that Shinto can expand only as an agency of political
and military control. This requiries a systematic subordination of non-Japanese
peoples which nullifies all pretense to universalism. At page 616, Holtom refers
to the teaching of the Shinto theologian Hirata Atsutane who maintained that the
members of the Japanese race were brought into existence through the creative
spirits of the sacred ancestral Kami. See Price, Japan Rides the Tiger, 1942;
Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 1944.
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men of savage condition. It was a reversion to the lowest
level of man's rational existence. It was savage tribalism at
its worst. It no longer considered man as a reasoning creature
but only as an animal living in a wolf pack, owing a duty
only to the pack, a duty to do all things which might be de-
sired by its appetite. All things and beings which frustrated
that appetite must be destroyed.
From the first appearance of the doctrines of racialism,
the Roman Pontiffs have denounced it, and counselled in-
terracial justice and charity between the nations. These
pronouncements enunciated anew the centuries old Christian
view that all persons, races, peoples, and nations were en-
titled to the enjoyment of an equality of moral rights. Thus
Benedict XV, in his Encyclical Pacem Dei,2 May 23, 1920,
stated that: "The Gospel does not contain one law of charity
for individuals and another law, different from the first, for
States and Nations." On March 14, 1937, Pope Pius XI,
declared in the Encyclical 11 which he addressed to the
German Bishops: "He who takes the race, or the people,
or the State, or the form of government *** and makes it
the ultimate norm of all, even of religious values, and deifies
it with idolatrous worship, perverts and falsifies the order
of things created and commanded by God ****" These
encyclicals were coupled by pronouncements like the letter
of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities,
under date of April 13, 1938, addressed to the Rectors of all
Catholic Universities and their Faculties throughout the
world, condemning theories which would make the blood of
a race the ultimate source of all of man's moral and intel-
lectual qualities.
12 Encyclical, Pacem Dei, n. 675, in Principles for Peace, Selections from
Papal Documents, Leo XIII to Pius XII, 1943, 284 at page 289. See: The
Pattern for Peace, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish Declaration, 1943, pamphlet
No. 34 of The Catholic Association for International Peace, 1944.
18 Encyclical, Mit Brennender Sorge n. 1172, op. cit. supra note 12 at page
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Papal teaching, past and present, as an authoritative
guide, condemns racialism. Reason, experience, and the
philosophy of the Church furnish additional proof to justify
such, condemnation. Race is manifestly a transitory fact, a
temporary stage in the growth of part of humanity. To-day
no nation is so racially homogeneous that its population can-
not be broken down into a number of sub-racial species; and
these in turn, into still more primitive racial strains. Races
change, die, merge with other races, become modified by
racial intermarriage, but that which is of its very nature
changeable, can never be the basis of an unchangeable meta-
physical body of principles of moral right and wrong.
There has long persisted the belief among peoples, even
before the Christian era, that the entire human race, an
organic unity, sprang from common ancestors who were
created by God. It was not until the nineteenth century
that a school of science formally attacked the doctrine of
the essential unity of the human race and began to assert
eugenic principles for the breeding of superior races of super-
men. On the natural level, unity or humanity results from
the faculty of reason, and the faculty of will, capable of
making free moral choices, both faculties being common to
all men. But in the nature of things, unity has no signifi-
cance, unless it is coupled with plurality. The wisdom of
scholastic philosophy understands and approves the phe-
nomenon of plurality which accompanies unity. The in-
trinsically necessary process of differentiation produced in
this connection, races, nations and states.
Because of the fundamental unity of humanity, each na-
tion, and hence the race or races from which it has been
formed, has the potential capacity to attain to the highest
grade of perfection. The civilization of each race has been
built, at least in part, upon that of other races. The ex-
perience of history verifies the conclusion that no race has
had a monopoly, even for a short interval of time, upon the
great contributions which have been made to the world's
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civilization. These are the result of the spiritual powers of
individual men and do not substantially depend upon the
biological factor. The scientist Lowie has written: " "We
are thus led to conclusions paralleling those arrived at in
the survey of intellectual achievement. In neither case can
observed differences be interpreted in racial terms; nor is
there any cultural stage that reveals a qualitative difference
either in intellectual operations or the fundamental na-
ture of the moral sentiments." Physical science has learned
how to breed fast race horses, for example, but it has not
yet succeeded in breeding a just-man, race or nation. The
pygmies of Africa, for example, have never built sky-
scrapers, they did not discover penicillin or radium, neither
did they reach a level of intellectual or physical life of cer-
tain communities of the white man, but before God they are
entitled to the rights flowing from human personality, under
the natural law.
As long as nations and their underlying races recognize
the spiritual value of all other races and nations, and act ac-
cordingly, so that their social claims do not exceed the re-
straining circle of natural law, they are free to glorify patriot-
ism and love of race and nation. The story of man's civiliza-
tion abounds with nobility of action inspired by race. Un-
questonably race, owever amorphous the concept, will
continue to be an important element in human society. Since
it cannot be eliminated, it must be given proper perspective
14 See: Scientific Aspects of the Race Problem (1941), Essay V, entitled
Intellectual and Cultural Achievements of Human Races, at page 244. At page
235, he writes: "Racialism does not explain observed differences in ethical out-
look, while specific differences can be demonstrably traced to non racial factors."
Ashley-Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, The Fallacy of Race, 1942. Ac-
cording to Hankins in The Racial Basis of Civilization, 1931, northern France is
perhaps more Teutonic than southern Germany, while eastern Germany is in
many places more Slavic than Russia. So-called Nordic types are relatively in-
frequent in Germany outside of Hanover, and certainly more numerous in north
and north central France than in Bavaria. Hooton, in Twilight of Man, 1939, at
page 126 and following, shows how the populations of the nations on the European
continent, and of the British Isles are made up of mixtures of various sub-racial
strains, such as the Nordic, Alpine, Atlanto-Mediterranean, Celtic, which in turn
were formed from pre-existing racial stocks.
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and turned to the. advantage, not the destruction, of the
human family. There must be no distortion of the values
of good attaching to race consciousness by severing the
concept of plurality from that of unity and exalting the
former to the exclusion of the latter. A functional dualism
of unity and plurality, in the sphere of race, with resultant
equilibrium, is necessary both nationally and internationally.
Race has, will, and should continue to be one of the most
powerful influences in dictating distinctive social customs,
structure of society, culture, language, institutions, and
manners of all kinds, but it ought never to be the determinant
of moral rights and duties. Pope Pius XII has said: "5
"Within the limits of a new order founded on moral prin-
ciples, there is no place for open or secret oppression of the
cultural and linguistic characteristics of national minorities
***" And again: " "The will of one nation to live must
never mean the sentence of death passed upon another."
The doctrine of scientific racialism was not formally elab-
orated until rather recently, (i.e.) after positive sociology
had been exhalted to the dignity of an exact science. Al-
though there was no official adoption of this doctrine by any
nation belonging to the family of civilized nations until the
thirties, it must be admitted, however, that much of the
policy and action which characterized the exploitation of
the European Colonial era, for example, did not conform to
the essential ideals of Christianity. The imperialism of not
a few Occidental nations, which began with the discovery of
the Americas, was given momentum by the forces of economic
greed and inordinate political utility. Despite the efforts of
the Church, there were unreasonable solutions of race prob-
lems by nations. There was a lag between ideal and action.
Christian white nations often colonized with the Bible in one
hand and a sword in the other, with forthright acceptance of
15 Radio Message, Nell 'Alba, December 24, 1941, n. 1759, op. cit. supra
note 12 at page 757.
16 Allocution In Questo Giorno di Santa, December, 1939.
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the economic benefits involved, and with disregard of the
rights of physically smaller and weaker races and nations.
Nevertheless the ideals of good faith, inter-national justice,
and brotherly love, as such, were never challenged in this
period, however much they were ignored in action. Devia-
tion from those ideals was regarded as reprehensible and
wrong.
The doctrine of racialism struck at basic principles of
Christianity. It was a direct attack. But it is now dis-
credited. The States which advocated it have already been
defeated or are on the verge of defeat. The great threat
to future fair dealings among the nations lies in the field of
danger of collateral attack upon those principles through the
manipulation of facts. There is the possibility that there
will be grave abuses of the principle which justifies the right
and the duty of one nation to exercise a measure of authority
over another because of the latter's inability to fulfill ade-
quately its duties toward civilization. There is no clash be-
tween this practice and the principles of Christianity, pro-
vided the facts are honestly and fully investigated, and
justify it; and provided the control exercised does not con-
travene the natural law, (i.e.) is just, charitable, and operates
bilaterally for the best spiritual and material interests of the
two nations, particularly the protected nation. As Luigi
Sturzo has written: 17 "*** We must not identify-as is
often done-natural rights, belonging to human personality,
with rights that -are born historically with the formation of a
nation. A nationality can undoubtedly claim a right to
religious freedom, as the Oriental and Balkan peoples did
under the Turks, or the Greek-Ruthenians of Poland under
the Czars, and yet fail to claim at the same time the right
to its own political personality. On the other hand, it could
give strength to its political revindication by uniting th
latter with that of despised or suppressed religious rights.
17 See: Race, Nation, Person, Social Aspects of the Race Problem, 1944,
Essay VI entitled Nationalism at page 175.
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Thus in the Irish case the fight for religious freedom, which
was climaxed 'by the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1S27,
came under the natural law and did not depend on any na-
tional development, whereas the fight for political autonomy
which ended in the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921,
was carried out on the basis of national and historical rights.
The difference is very great: we call the former absolute
and natural rights, the latter relative and historical rights,
in order to accentuate the fact that the latter came to fruition
only as the historical process unfolds itself and are sub-
ordinated to the exigencies, the rights and the possibilities
of common life among the several peoples."
One of the great tasks which confronts the nations of the
future is the creation of fact finding commissions and
juridical institutions of world scope which can apply sound
moral principles to these facts and compel action by the
proper sanctions. The work of the Dumbarton Oaks Con-
ference was an attempt to do this, as was that of the San
Francisco Conference.
In the forthcoming international order, the juridical forms
will succeed only if the external tranquillity, which they aim
to produce, is accompanied by an internal order of justice
and charity. As Grotius has written: 18 "Fidelity in ful-
filling what has been promised is the foundation not only of
each particular state, but also of this great society which
includes all nations." If hate, distrust and irresponsibility
are allowed to thrive within the internal order, juridical
forms and mechanism will ultimately break under the strain.
To use the words of Gonella, 19 a celebrated legal philosopher
of Vatican City: "Anyone who is interested in practicing a
vigorous and militant Christianity, in the sphere of relations
between peoples, must undertake to make clear not only
the truth and beauty of charity as an ideal, but also the
possibility of realizing that ideal."
18 Grot-us, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 3, 29, 1.
19 Gonella, A World to Reconstruct transl. by Bouscaren, at page 15, (1944).
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The great moral axioms which embody the spirit of Chris-
tianity in relation to the individual may be extended by
analogy to races and nations. Thus, it behooves each nation
to do unto every other nation what it would like that other
nation to do unto it. No nation may use another nation as
a means toward an unjust end. No nation may place barriers
in the way of any other nation so as to frustrate its reason-
able and legitimate aspirations for growth. All political,
juridical institutions including those of the State and in-
ternational law exist in last analysis to protect the rights of
individuals.20
The successful operation of the machinery of peace among
the nations, begun at the San Francisco Conference, will not
be. possible unless race and nation are viewed in a perspec-
tive of history and philosophy, so that their rights and their
duties may be clearly understood and translated into action.
In this process, it will be necessary to eliminate the concept
of the absolute value of race and nation, and to solve the
problems of race through reason, which dictates justice, and
through religion, which counsels charity. The nations of
to-morrow, in the aftermath of global war, must act upon
the faith that while there exists great diversity among na-
tional groupings of men, and in their racial components, in
the matters of size, wealth, characteristics, and past and
present contributions to the world's civilization, yet they
are essentially the same in their nature, and therefore, are
entitled to an equality of moral right. Evidently there will
be honest disagreement as to the precise means by which
this right should be translated into action at different times
and in different places. But the formulation of the principle
is important because it clearly separates two vastly differing
fields of conduct.
Brendan F. Brown.
Washington, D. C.
20 See: Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. q. 29, a. 3, where he writes that
person signifies that which is most perfect in all nature.
